



**THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment**

NOTE FOR: DCI  
DDCI

FROM : DD/NFA

While Dick is well ahead of the remainder of the Community, that is the NIO/Warning function. If you agree, I am prepared to circulate the attached to Haig, Weinberger, Allen and anyone else you should wish, simply saying that the DCI thought the paper might be of interest. We could get it out by LDX tonight.

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

Attachment  
TS-815783

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SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

20 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

FROM : Richard Lehman  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Poland

1. This is to inform you that I believe the present relaxed atmosphere in Washington with regard to Poland is unjustified. In making this judgment, I face a dilemma. Despite the events of last night, analysts apparently believe that somehow the Polish regime will, once again, defuse a prospective crisis. The general view is that a formal Alert Memorandum is not warranted at this time. Nevertheless, a few of us for some time have had strong visceral sensations that the analysts are wrong and that a move against the leaders of Solidarity and/or KOR is a live possibility. It could occur as early as this weekend. Our views are strengthened by the events of last night.

2. I believe the Community judgment is flawed for a number of reasons:

-- With a few exceptions, analysts are not privy to [redacted] and this is fundamental to an understanding of the present situation. We know that detailed preparations have been made for the imposition of martial law, although we have no evidence that a decision to implement it has as yet been taken.

-- They are over-emphasizing the possibility of Soviet intervention as the threat to be concerned over and under-emphasizing the possibility of preemptive measures by the Poles, although the latter is likely to precipitate the former.


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- [REDACTED]
- The ups and downs of the protracted crisis have given it a routine character in the eyes of many, and they are perhaps insensitive to its progressive deterioration.
  - We may be the target of Soviet or Polish deception. (The publicity that has been given to intelligence findings on events in and around Poland has given the Soviets and Poles excellent instruction in what they need to conceal if they want surprise. Indeed, maximum surprise would be essential if there were any hope of avoiding bloodshed.)

3. There is another interpretation, plausible at least to me, that can be given to recent events.


- Developments in Poland since the summer are clearly unacceptable to the Soviets, at least in the long run. The Soviets almost brought themselves to the use of force in early December, but were persuaded by Kania that he could bring the situation under control if given time.
- Since the Warsaw Pact meeting of 5 December Soviet readiness has been lowered and the situation in Poland has not again reached the boiling point, as leaders on both sides work for calm. No fundamental change in the situation has occurred, however. Moreover, the Polish government has backed down on every issue that threatened confrontation until last night. (If Kania, however reluctantly, has capitulated to Soviet demands and plans a preemptive declaration of martial law, he will continue to back down in the interim so as not to create an incident and tip his hand prematurely.)
- On the other hand the Polish government conducted an exercise [REDACTED] to review its state of readiness to implement martial law. During January and February a number of moves were made to place military and internal affairs officials in key points in transport and communications networks.




- On 4 March Kania met with the Soviet leadership. There is some fragmentary evidence that he was given an ultimatum at this time.
- In subsequent days the Polish regime began moves against certain dissident leaders, but failed to follow through when these leaders defied its orders. It also backed down to the workers in Radom.
- Most agree that if martial law is declared, it will occur when the factories are unoccupied, probably on Sunday.



4. This sequence of events is quite suggestive. Against it, however, must be placed the reassurance given us by the Soviets and the Poles and the obvious interest of the Polish government, church, and Solidarity in keeping the situation under control. In sum, while we have no evidence that the Polish regime will crack down and declare martial law in the near future, and while we feel this would be Kania's last resort, there is evidence that some contingency measures have been taken already, and there are good reasons to think we may be approaching a most advantageous time to preempt. The events of last night could be interpreted as a deliberate provocation. Should martial law be declared and Polish armed forces lose control, Soviet intervention will follow.

  
Richard Lehman



The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Poland

Attached is a memorandum from Dick Lehman, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. He is out in front of the remainder of the Community, but that is his job. I am forwarding the paper to you as a matter of interest.

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.

Attachment  
TS-815783

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: Poland (TS-815783)

C/NIC:RL:lm (20 Mar 81)

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